Access read Read past the organisational chart to the procurement line, because that is the part with commercial consequences. Until now, a company selling medicines or devices into Argentina’s national hospital system negotiated with five separate institutions, each with its own purchasing process, timetable and clinical committee. From this decree onward the counterparty is one agency with a dedicated contracting function and an explicit mandate to unify criteria. That cuts both ways and it is worth being honest about which way it cuts for whom. A single national buyer purchasing for five hospitals has more leverage on price than five buyers acting separately, which is the point of centralised procurement everywhere it has been tried. It also creates one relationship to win rather than five, which favours suppliers with the scale to service a national contract and disadvantages those who built their position hospital by hospital. The harder question is clinical. These five institutions are not similar: a general hospital, a rehabilitation institute and a specialist mental health and addictions network have genuinely different formularies and purchasing needs, and unified criteria imposed across dissimilar institutions is where consolidation reforms usually falter. Watch the first tenders ANES issues. They will show whether this is a purchasing reform or an accounting one.